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Massive police investigations rarely go smoothly; the frantic
search for the sniper was no exception  UsNews.
BY JEFF GLASSER
When the deadly rampage of alleged snipers John Allen Muhammad
and John Lee Malvo came to a stunning end last week, the
massive police task force that worked round the clock got a
well-deserved round of applause. But experts say the
postmortems will also reveal tantalizing missed opportunities
and bureaucratic snafus–as well as a host of lessons learned
from the investigation's failures andits successes.
Authorities say serial killers who move around expose a basic
weakness in American law enforcement–there are some 19,000
different departments nationwide. In the sniper case, a
patchwork of 13 local and federal law enforcement entities
struggled to coordinate their pursuit of a duo whose alleged
crimes spread across six counties in two states and the
District of Columbia. "We don't have a system in place to deal
with a serial killer like this," says David Schertler, who
prosecuted homicide cases for the U.S. attorney's office in
Washington, D.C.
Agencies that guard their territory like independent grand
duchies duplicated witness interviews, according to a source
close to the investigation. Instead of answering to a single
chain of command, the investigators took their marching orders
from respective supervisors. "One more week and you would have
seen a major overhaul of the operation," says Vernon Geberth,
a former New York City detective who teaches homicide
investigation techniques.
The problem was compounded by out-of-date computers; the FBI's
Rapid Start system was cynically labeled "Rapid Stop,"
according to published reports. "The 'Rapid Start' system is .
. . not meant to handle this kind of volume," says former cop
John Cohen, now a law-enforcement consultant.
Information overload. The processing of tips from the public
also became a nightmare; authorities had to set up an 800
number tip line in Montgomery County because 911 lines were
overwhelmed. Instead of staffing it with professionals, the
FBI had trainees answer the phones; the sniper complained in a
note that initially the call takers did not take him seriously
during a key October 17 exchange and five other calls. "We
need to make it easier for people to get through to
authorities," says Cohen. Federal officials countered that it
was hard to sort the real from the phony when they were
logging 400 calls an hour and asserted that more experienced
investigators were needed in the field.
The dizzying array of law enforcement databases proved both a
blessing and a curse. A key break in the case was provided by
a federal database that contained a fingerprint of Malvo
obtained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; that
matched a latent print from the Montgomery, Ala., liquor store
killing, but local police who first investigated that case
didn't have quick or ready access to that database. Similar
concerns were raised following 9/11. In April, the president
of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
complained that the design of the federal databases "has the
effect of limiting the ability of state and local law
enforcement agencies to access vital information."
By contrast, there was lots of information from witnesses and
"profilers," but much of it turned out to be erroneous.
Candice DeLong, a retired FBI profiler, notes that profiling
is "an art as well as a science," but the public may have been
swayed by profilers saying that the culprit was likely to be a
single, white loner. Similarly, early witness statements
caused authorities to focus on a white van or box truck. On
October 12, Washington, D.C., Police Chief Charles Ramsey said
a Chevrolet Caprice was also being sought, but Montgomery
County Police Chief Charles Moose downplayed the Caprice the
next day.
Some experts did give Moose and the task force high marks for
their use of the press. "They did a great job drawing out the
dialogue with the sniper," says Louis Hennessy, former head of
the homicide unit for the Washington, D.C., police. "The
information helped . . . capture the suspects." But task force
investigators initially didn't want the description and
license-plate number of the suspects' vehicle released; it
leaked out anyway, and a truck driver alerted police to the
car's location. "To be blunt," says the source close to the
investigation, "if the [trucker] didn't hear the newscast
about plates, those guys could still be out on the road."

November 4, 2002.
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